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101.
102.
Computing the longest common subsequence of two sequences is one of the most studied algorithmic problems. In this work we focus on a particular variant of the problem, called repetition free longest common subsequence (RF-LCSRF-LCS), which has been proved to be NP-hard. We propose a hybrid genetic algorithm, which combines standard genetic algorithms and estimation of distribution algorithms, to solve this problem. An experimental comparison with some well-known approximation algorithms shows the suitability of the proposed technique.  相似文献   
103.
A variant of Davenport’s constant   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
Let p be a prime number. Let G be a finite abelian p-group of exponent n (written additively) and A be a non-empty subset of ]n[≔ {1, 2,…, n} such that elements of A are incongruent modulo p and non-zero modulo p. Let kD(G/|A| be any integer where D(G) denotes the well-known Davenport’s constant. In this article, we prove that for any sequence g 1, g 2,…, g k (not necessarily distinct) in G, one can always extract a subsequence with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k such that
where a j A for all j. We provide examples where this bound cannot be improved. Furthermore, for the cyclic groups, we prove some sharp results in this direction. In the last section, we explore the relation between this problem and a similar problem with prescribed length. The proof of Theorem 1 uses group-algebra techniques, while for the other theorems, we use elementary number theory techniques.  相似文献   
104.
研究差分方程……的全局性质,其中A,B,β∈(O,+∞),p,q∈N<'+>={1,2,…},α=max{p,q),γ<,1>,γ<,2>,…,γ<,p>,C<,1>,C<,2>,…,C<,q>∈[0,1],满足∑γ<,i>=∑C<,J>=1,初始值x<,0>,x<-1>,…,x<,α>∈(0,∞).得到该方程的每个正...  相似文献   
105.
This paper concerns two-person zero-sum games for a class of average-payoff continuous-time Markov processes in Polish spaces.The underlying processes are determined by transition rates that are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff function may have neither upper nor lower bounds.We use two optimality inequalities to replace the so-called optimality equation in the previous literature.Under more general conditions,these optimality inequalities yield the existence of the value of the game and of a pair of ...  相似文献   
106.
In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, Maeda and Cunlin constructed several models in symmetric triangular and asymmetric triangular fuzzy environment, respectively. We extended their models in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and proposed the existence of equilibrium strategies for these models. We also established the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix game. In addition, numerical examples are presented to find Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy from bi-matrix game.  相似文献   
107.
This paper deals with a procurement problem of missiles involving the efficient assignment of the missiles to some targets. Within a fixed amount of budget, a leader purchases several types of missiles, by which he aims to damage as much value as possible a follower hides into some facilities later. The effectiveness of the missile depends on the type of missile and facility. A payoff of the game is the expected amount of destroyed value. The problem is generalized as a two-person zero-sum game of distributing discrete resources with a leader and a follower. Our problem is to derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game. This type of game has an abundance of applications. The problem is first formulated into an integer programming problem with a non-separable objective function of variables and it is further equivalently transformed into a maximin integer knapsack problem. We propose three exacts methods and an approximation method for an optimal solution.  相似文献   
108.
鞍点集的结构   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
俞超  俞建 《运筹学学报》2000,4(4):71-74
本文对两人零和对策给出了其鞍点集是凸的或闭的充分条件。  相似文献   
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